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1. Introduction 
Labor economists often invoke the existence of internal labor markets to 
explain anomalous behavior of workers and firms. An example is the insider-
outsider theory that divides workers into incumbent employees and the 
excluded unemployed. However, internal labor market theory is not firmly 
based on optimizing behavior of workers and firms. It is rather a bundie of 
ideas aimed at explaining certain observed phenomena than a rigid theory that 
yields testable predictions. 
Internal labor market theory stresses the importance of career paths within a 
firm. Positions form a job ladder and external hiring is concentrated at the 
bottom of the ladder. Job openings at higher positions are filled by internal 
mobility. The internal labor market theory hypothesizes that adrniriistrative 
rules rather than optimizing behavior govern the rate and direction of internal 
mobility (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). These rules lead to high employment 
stability and a relation between wages and jobs and not between wages and 
worker characteristics as predicted by the neoclassical theory of the firm 
(Creedy and Whitfield, 1988). Hence, the interaal labor market theory belongs 
to the school of institutional economics. 
This paper is a contribution to the small empirical literature on internal 
labor markets. We investigate the prevalence of internal labor markets by 
testing some obvious predictions of internal labor market theory. In our 
analysis we use panel data of Dutch firms which were surveyed in 1988 and 
1990. We start by looking at some descriptive statistics. If there are internal 
labor markets, one would expect the internal mobility rate to be much larger 
than the (external) hiring rate. This is because a job opening at a higher 
position is filled on the internal labor market which may lead to a job opening 
at a lower position which is filled in the same way until the entry level is 
reached at which external hiring occurs. Hence, the internal labor market 
theory predicts that, except at the entry level, a job opening leads to multiple 
moves of employees and at most one instance of external hiring. However, in 
our data we find that per year on average 3.4% of the employees moves 
within the firm, while a number equal to 11.9% of the employees is hired on 
the external labor market. 
We also investigate the relationship between internal mobility and quit rates. 
According to the theory of the internal labor market employers use internal 
mobility as an instrument to reduce turnover, so one would expect a negative 
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relationship between both flows of workers. However, we find that there is a 
positive correlation between these flows. 
Together these two pieces of evidence indicate that internal labor markets 
are not important in Dutch firms. First, most job openings are filled by 
external hiring. This is only consistent with the existence of internal labor 
markets if most job openings occur at the entry level. Second, the positive 
relation between the quit rate and the internal mobility rate dominates. Hence, 
firms with a high level of internal mobility do not have lower quits. The 
internal labor market is not an effective instrument in reducing external 
turnover. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theory of the 
internal labor market and gives a short overview of empirical research. 
Furthermore, a simple model of interaal mobility and quits is presented. 
Section 3 describes the data that we used in our analysis. Section 4 gives the 
stylized facts on the relationship between internal mobility and external hiring. 
Section 5 presents the results of the analysis of the relationship between quits 
and internal mobility. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Internal labor markets 
2.1 Theory and empirical studies 
By assumption, a firm with an internal labor market only hires at the bottom 
of the job ladder. Subsequently, new hires may be promoted to higher job 
levels. According to Doeringer and Piore (1971) this implies that there is 
more job mobility within firms than between firms. One specific type of 
mobility they stress is 'osmotic mobility' in which the nature of the tasks of a 
worker changes gradually. As a consequence, over a long period the type of 
work may change substantially. Of course, if this type of mobility is predomi-
nant, then conventional measures of internal mobility may be badly biased. 
However, an internal labor market conditions the reaction to more abrupt 
changes in the position of employees. A position change leads to a sequence of 
internal moves of employees until the bottom of the job ladder is reached. 
Only at that level an external hire occurs. Hence, the internal labor market 
theory predicts that the number of internal changes of position, i.e. the 
internal mobility flow, exceeds the number of external hires, i.e. the external 
mobility flow. Below, we test this prediction. 
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The main reason for an internal labor market is the creation of a durable 
relationship between workers and firms. Employers want to ensure that they 
have a stable and dedicated work force. By hiring workers at low-level 'ports-
of-entry' and observing their behavior, firms minimize hiring costs. The 
observed productivity at low-level jobs is used to determine who stays and 
gets promoted to high-level jobs. So, most jobs are filled from the ranks of 
current employees. Once an investment is made in a worker, a firm finds it 
costly for workers to quit (Wachter and Wright, 1990). Therefore, they offer 
these employees an inside track on upper-level vacancies. If employees quit, 
they lose this privileged position. Thus, they are motivated to stay. 
The allocation of jobs in the internal labor market is determined by a set of 
administrative rules and procedures and not by economie variables. Wages are 
attached to jobs rather than to workers. This implies that the promotion rules 
within the firm determine the allocation of wages to workers. Therefore, the 
most important rules are the rules on entry and promotion. The rules for entry 
can vary according to conditions in the extemal labor market. The promotion 
rules reflect a compromise between seniority and ability as relevant criteria, 
where the suggestion is that the former is more acceptable to the worker and 
the latter to the employer (Creedy and Whitfield, 1988). 
The internal labor market theory has not led to much empirical work by 
economists. The available empirical studies focus on one or a few elements of 
the internal labor market. Many of the studies merely classify firms or 
industrial sectors as having or not having an internal labor market on the basis 
of one or more criteria. The major classification criterium is low labor 
turnover. An early example of an empirical study is Alexander (1974) who 
introduces annual labor turnover as a criterium for an internal labor market in 
a firm or an industry. If annual labor turnover is less than 10%, then there is 
an internal labor market. Other studies, like for example Mace (1979) use a 
list of features like low turnover, entry ports and promotion ladders. An 
interesting attempt to investigate the internal labor market is the study by 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1993), who analyze personnel records for all 
salaried management employees of a large U.S. firm over a period of 20 
years. They conclude that although hiring is concentrated at the lower job 
levels, entry is important at all levels, suggesting that the emphasis given to 
ports of entry may be unwarranted. 
Only a few studies present a statistical analysis of the relationship between 
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relevant interaal labor market characteristics or use firm level data in their 
analysis. A rare example is Pfeffer and Cohen (1984) who use data on 309 
firms with at least 100 employees in the San Francisco Bay Area. They 
construct a measure of the extent of the internal labor market using a large 
number of indicators. From regression equations with this measure as depend-
ent variable they conclude that firms that rely on-the-job training and have a 
personnel department, score higher on the measure for an internal labor 
market. Firm size appears to have a significantly positive effect on the extent 
of the internal labor market if the personnel department is left out. 
It is clear that most studies rely on rather indirect measures of the extent of 
internal labor markets and as a consequence tend to take the existence of such 
markets for granted. The results can hardly be interpreted as tests of the 
internal labor market theory. 
2.2 Flows of workers and internal mobility 
Internal mobility is one of the flows of workers detennining the allocation of 
labor. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the number of jobs in two 
subsequent periods and the flows of workers to, from and within the firm1. In 
period t there are Jt jobs in the firm. In period t+1, JDt+1 jobs are destroyed 
while Jct+1 jobs are created. Obviously, employment increases if Jct+i > JDt+i, 
and decreases if JDt+1 > Jct+1. 
figure 1 about here 
Workers may separate from a firm for different reasons: quit, lay-off or a 
transition out of the labor force (pension, disability). Figure 1 distinguishes 
separations by two origins: from existing jobs (XI) or from jobs which have 
been destroyed (X2). Workers on current jobs may move internally to other 
current jobs (IM1) or to newly created jobs (IM2). Workers who hold jobs 
that are destroyed may move internally to either surviving jobs (IM3) or to 
newly created jobs (IM4). Finally, there are flows of newly hired workers to 
newly created jobs (Hl) or to positions left by workers (H2). 
From figure 1 it is clear that many workers may flow in and out of the firm 
1
 The figure is simplified by omitting vacant jobs. 
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or change jobs within the firm even if the total emplbyment does not change 
much (Hamermesh et al., 1994). What does the internal labor market theory 
predict concerning these flows of workers? 
Let us first consider the hiring decision of the employer who can choose 
between promoting an incumbent worker or hiring a new worker. Hence, we 
consider a vacant position at a higher level than an entry job where only 
workers from outside the firm are hired. As usual the employer compares the 
costs and benefits of the two options. 
We assume that after additional training there is no difference in productiv-
ity between incumbent workers and workers who come from outside the firm. 
Of course, there will be a difference in the amount of training necessary to do 
the job, since the incumbent worker may already know the firm and the tasks 
connected to the job. 
In bis recruitment decision the employer compares the (expected) hiring 
costs of an external worker with the (expected) hiring costs of an internal 
worker on the assumption that he pays both the same wage. The worker with 
the lowest hiring costs will be chosen. The hiring costs are the sum of the 
search, screening and training costs. All these are lower for the internal 
candidate. Hence, the internal labor market theory predicts that higher level 
vacancies are filled by moving workers up the job ladder. 
If the benefit to the firm of low turnover is large, then the firm may use the 
internal labor market to prevent quits of workers. Of course, this only works 
if it also is beneficial to the employees. In his decision to quit a worker bal-
ances the costs and benefits. The behefits consist of the higher wage to be 
earned elsewhere. The costs of a quit are the search costs and the loss of firrn-
specific human capital or more precisely, the loss of a career opportunity 
within the current firm. Therefore, the worker does not quit if the career 
prospects within the firm are sufficiently favourable. 
We conclude that the internal labor market theory yields at least two 
testable predictions. First, in filling open positions the employer prefers 
internal job candidates. Second, if the employer is confronted with substantial 
turnover costs he tries to prevent quits by offering good career prospects 
within the firm. This implies that there is a negative correlation between quits 
and internal mobility. Below, we investigate the validity of both predictions. 
But first, we describe the data we use in our analysis. 
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3. The data 
We use a unique data set, which is based on two subsequent surveys held in 
the Netherlands. The surveys sample organizations, which we refer to as 
firms. These firms are from all industries including government and education 
and have at least 10 employees. The sample is stratified according to area of 
economie activity and size of the firm (three classes: 10-49, 50-99, 100+ 
workers). 
Each survey uses two questionnaires. The first questionnaire concerns 
qualitative characteristics and financial data. The second questionnaire gathers 
administrative information about the firm. The response to the second ques-
tionnaire is 75-80 percent of the response to the first one. 
In 1988 the sample consisted of 2041 firms, in 1990 of 2017 firms. The 
surveys were set up as a panel, but a large number of the 1988 firms did not 
cooperate in 1990, had a substantial change in activities or experienced a 
merger. The gross panel sample consists of 1168 firms. If we remove those 
firms for which we do not know quits or interaal mobility we have an inter-
mediate sample of 444 firms. After removing those firms which do not 
provide essential information for our empirical analysis a net sample of 158 
panel firms remains. Figure 2 is based on data of 1158 firms for 1990. 
The definitions of the main variables in our analysis are presented in 
Appendix 1. Employment is measured as the number of employees in Decem-
ber 1988 (1990) irrespective of the number of hours they worked. Workers 
with temporary contracts shorter than one year are excluded in the sample.2 
The number of quits is measured as the number of annual voluntary separ-
ations other than into retirement or early retirement. Internal mobility is 
measured as the annual number of employees who change function and/or de-
partment within the firm. 
Table 1 shows that there are many firms in our sample which experience no 
internal mobility or quits in one or both years. Only 45 of the 158 firms have 
both a positive internal mobility and quits in both years. 
table 1 about here 
2
 On average, the fraction of workers with a temporary contract shorter than one 
year is 9% of the total number of employees. 
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In our empirical analysis both quits and interaal mobility are calculated as 
rates in which the number of employees at the beginning of the year is used as 
a denominator. We denote the quit and internal mobility rate by q and im, 
respectively. 
We performed several checks of the potential selectivity of the net sample. 
First, we investigated to which extent our main dependent variables, the quit 
and internal mobility rates are affected by the selection. The average quit rate 
is 0.071 in the gross sample and 0.056 in the net panel sample. The average 
interaal mobility rate is about the same in both samples, 0.032. Second, we 
checked whether the means of a number of (explanatory) variables differed 
between the net and gross sample. We did not find significant differences. 
Third, a comparison of the fraction of firms with zero quits or zero internal 
mobility in the intermediate sample of 444 firms with the fraction in the net 
sample of 158 firms did not show a substantial difference. We take this as 
evidence that selection bias is not an important problem in our sample. 
4. Internal mobility and external hiring: stylized facts 
The first testable prediction which can be derived from the internal labor 
market theory is that employers prefer current employees to external candi-
dates. This implies that the internal mobility rate is larger than the external 
hiring rate. 
Our data contain information on this prediction. For each firm, if there had 
been any internal mobility, hiring or separation of workers during the year, 
information on the most recent worker in these flows was registered. The 
respondent of the firm reported whether the worker came from a destroyed or 
existing job (in case of X and IM), or whether the worker went to a (newly) 
created job or existing job (in case of H and X). Aggregation of the worker 
information over the firms gives estimates of the relevant fractions, which 
after multiplication with H, X or IM gives the size of each of the subflows. 
figure 2 about here 
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Figure 2 gives the estimates.3 It appears that in 1990 2.6% of the existing 
jobs were destroyed. New jobs were created at a rate equal to 4.4% of the 
existing jobs. Jobs which were destroyed mainly caused workers to leave the 
firm (1.9%). A small number of these workers moved to an existing job 
within the firm (0.4%) or to a newly created job (0.3%). Newly created jobs 
were mainly taken by externally hired workers (3.2%). Some of these jobs 
were taken by incumbent workers (0.9%). The inflow and outflow of workers 
mainly involved flows to and from existing jobs. Internal mobility between 
existing jobs was small (1.8%). 
The total flow of workers to jobs was 15.3% of which 11.9% involved 
exteraal hiring and 3.4% internal mobility. So, the probability that an internal 
candidate filled a vacancy was about 22%. Hence, it appears that the hiring 
rate of workers through internal channels was relatively small compared to the 
hiring rate of workers from outside the firm. This result suggests that it is 
easier for a worker to get a job in a different firm than to get promotion in the 
current firm. This is a first indication that internal labor markets may not be 
very important within firms4. 
5. The correlation between quits and internal mobility 
The second testable prediction that can be derived from the internal labor 
market theory is that employers try to prevent quits by offering career pros-
pects within the firm. This implies that there is a negative correlation between 
the quit and internal mobility rates. 
We start our investigation by looking at simple correlations between quit 
and internal mobility rates. 
3Underlying figure 2 is the identity H - X = J C - J D . H - X equals 1.8, but the 
raw estimates of the flows implied Jc - JD = 2.6. To obtain the identity we adjusted 
Hl and X2 by adding öjHl and ö2X2, respectively. The optimal weights è, are those 
that minimize the quadratic loss function 8* + ö22, subject to 
(1 + öi)Hl - (1 + 52)X2 = H - X + IM3 - IM4. 
4
 According to internal labour market theory the allocation of jobs is determined 
by rules and procedures. However, only 22% of the firms in our sample use formal 
procedures when it comes to career planning. This is additional evidence that 
internal labour markets are not very important within firms. 
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table 2 about here 
Table 2 presents correlations between quit and internal mobility rates for both 
the intermediate sample of 444 firms and the net sample of 158 firms. There 
are some, but unimportant, differences between the samples, except for the 
correlation in which is corrected for firm specific effects. We concentrate on 
the correlations in the net sample. Table 2 shows that the intertemporal 
correlation of quit rates (0.493) is larger than the intertemporal correlation of 
internal mobility rates (0.173). This suggests that quit rates are more stable 
than internal mobility rates. The average correlation coëfficiënt between quit 
and internal mobility rates is 0.173. If we correct for firm specific effects we 
fmd a much lower but still positive correlation coëfficiënt of 0.069. For the 
intermediate sample the coëfficiënt has a larger value of 0.133. 
There are two obvious objections against the use of simple correlation 
coefficients to investigate the relationship between quits and internal mobility. 
First, there are many firms with a zero quit and/or internal mobility rate. 
Second, the correlation coëfficiënt does not account for changes in the envi-
ronment of the firm. Therefore, we need an appropriate statistical model. 
5.1 The Statistical Model 
In obtaining an estimate of the correlation between the quit and intemal 
mobility rate we must take account of: 
a. the substantial fraction of firms with a zero quit and/or internal mobility 
rate; 
b. firm-specific effects; 
c. changes in the environment of the firm. 
To deal with a. we use a Tobit formulation. We take account of b. through 
the inclusion of a random firm effect, p,r This is important because we want to 
distinguish between reactions to permanent differences in the interaal mobility 
rate and reaction to random shocks in this rate. Finally, we deal with c. by 
including time varying regressors. 
The index k refers to the dependent variables. The indices i,j refer to firms 
and s,t refer to time periods. N and T are the cross-section dimension and 
time dimension, respectively. The dependent variables are the quit (yiit; k=l) 
and internal mobility (y2it; k=2) rate. The model is 
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(la) y'iit = Pi\ + nu + £lit 
(lb) y*2it = jSa'xs, + /*2i + e2it 
for i,j = l,..,N and t,s = l,..,T, 
in which5: E(/%) = 0 
E(ekit) = 0 
E0*uM2j) = 0 
E(£iit£2js) = 5y^ts^i2 
E(/^ki2) = rk2 
E(ekit2) = <rk2 
and: 
(lc) ykit = max (y*kit,0).6 
In the sequel we omit the subscript i. Moreover, for ease of exposition we 
take T=2. Because the e^ are uncorrelated over time we derive the likelihood 
function by first conditioning on /*x and fi2 and subsequently marginalizing 
with respect to these random variables. Define 
(2) ^ = l(y'kt>0) 
The contribution of an individual firm to the likelihood is 
5
 öjj and ö^ are Kronecker delta's. 
6This is essentially the Tobit version of the simultanous Probit model with 
random intercept used by Sickles and Taubman (1986). We could allow for a 
nonzero correlation between nü and \x^, because if T=2 we can identify T12 from 
E(Mi + sn)(fh + «22 ) = rn 
and, hence we have 
on = E(0i! + Cn)0*2 + £2i)) - r12 
In other words, the relevant covariances are identified. 
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with 
(4) Pe = _ Ö"l2 
axo2 
and < i^(.), #i(.) (4>2(-,-;p), i>2(.,.;p)) the univariate (bivariate) Normal p.d.f 
and c.d.f., respectively. 
The likelihood function is obtained by multiplying the contributions of the 
firms in the sample. The estimates reported below are MLE's obtained by 
maximizing this likelihood function. 
5.2 Explanatory variables 
To account for changes in the environment of the firm and observed differ-
ences in firm characteristics we introducé a number of (time varying) 
regressors. We include explanatory variables which we expect to be important 
determinants of either quit or internal mobility rates or both. 
Although quits and internal mobility originate from an interaction between 
employer and employee we take the perspective of the employee when 
discussing possible determinants of quits and the perspective of the employer 
when discussing internal mobility. 
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The decision of the worker to start looking for a new job outside the firm 
originates from a cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, individual characteristics 
like the age of the worker may be important. Young workers easily change 
jobs at different employers because the costs in terms of loss of firm specific 
human capital are low and potential benefits are high because the remaining 
working life is long. Many studies indicate that job mobility falls as age rises. 
Furthermore, it may matter whether a worker has a parttime or a full time 
job. Parttime workers may have a large quit rate since they have invested less 
in firm-specific capital. If the fraction of workers on sickness leave is rather 
large, then this may indicate the response of workers to bad working condi-
tions which stimulates quits. Potential loss of firm specific human capital is 
the start-up period, the time spent on the job necessary to become productive. 
The presence of educational facilities may increase the general human capital 
of the workers which stimulates quits. Finally, if the wage of the workers is 
high compared to other firms within the sarne sector, then workers are less 
inclined to quit. 
From the perspective of the employer internal mobility is determined by the 
cost involved. The age of the workers may have a positive effect on internal 
mobility because younger workers have less job-specific human capital and 
therefore loose less human capital when they move internally. An employer 
will benefit longer from a full time worker compared to a parttime worker. 
Hence the fraction of parttime workers is expected to have a negative impact 
on internal mobility. We expect a negative impact of the fraction of workers 
on sickness leave, because a large rate makes it is more difficult to have 
internal mobility. A longer starting up period reduces internal mobility, 
because of the loss of job specific human capital. The presence of educational 
facilities will stimulate internal mobility, since the costs involved will be 
reduced. We also expect a positive influence of the size of the firm. If more 
jobs are present, reallocating workers within the firm becomes easier. Finally, 
a higher wage relative to other jobs within the same sector, indicates the 
policy of a firm to have more internal mobility. Appendix 1 provides defini-
tions of the variables. 
table 3 about here 
Table 3 presents the averages of the variables in the panel dataset of 158 
12 
firms. The average annual quit rate is 5.6%. The average annual internal 
mobility rate is 3.2%, and consists of 3 components: a change of function, 
(1.7%), a change of department (0.6%) or both (0.9%). About 30% of the 
workers is younger than 30 years. The share of parttime workers is 17%, the 
fraction of workers on sickness leave is 8%. About 22% of the firms has a 
starting up period longer than 300 days, while 24% of the workers had some 
on the job training during the year. The average number of employees per 
firm is 108. 
5.3 Estimation results 
Tables 4A and 4B present the estimation results of two bivariate Tobit 
regressions. The first estimate concerns a pooled regression, i.e. all firms 
have the same intercept. The second estimate allows for firm-specific effects. 
table 4A,B about her e 
The results of the Likelihood-ratio test7 on a change of the coefficients and 
(co)variances between both years (Pesaran et al., 1985) indicate that the 
bivariate Tobit regressions can be pooled over both years. From tables 4A,B it 
appears that for the quit rate and the internal mobility rate there is little 
difference between the estimated coefficients of the first and second column. 
We find a significant effect on the quit rate of the share of young workers 
and the dummy variable for the year 1990. Quit rates at the firm level are 
positively influenced by the share of young workers. Apart from that, there is 
an autonomous growth of the quit rate. This autonomous growth probably 
reflects improved labor market conditions. For the internal mobility rate the 
estimates indicate that the share of young workers has a positive influence on 
internal mobility, while firms with educational facilities have more internal 
mobility than firms without these facilities. The fraction of workers on 
sickness leave has a negative impact (significant at 10% level). Large firms 
have more internal mobility than small firms. 
7
 The test statistic x is constructed as 2(Lgg + L*, - Lgg+go), where Lt is the 
maximized log-likelihood value of year t. Under H0 (equal coefficients and (co)vari-
ances) is x asymptotically x2k+1, where k is the number of estimated parameters. 
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Furthermore, in the internal mobility equation the Standard error of the 
unobserved firm-specific effect is insignificant. The firm-specific effect of the 
quit equation is non negligible. It captures one third of the total variation of 
the error term. After introduction of the firm specific effects, the correlation 
term in the error structure drops slightly from 0.159 to 0.152. So even after 
introduction of explanatory variables and firm specific effects, the correlation 
between quits and interaal mobility is still positive and significant. 
The reduced form estimates demonstrate the dominance of the positive 
correlation between the quit rate and the internal mobility rate. The estimates 
of a structural model in which both rates are allowed to influence each other 
directly confirm these results (see Appendix 2): there is only a weak and 
insignificant negative influence of internal mobility on quits. The estimates 
lead to the impression that the positive correlation between quits and internal 
mobility is induced by the positive impact from quits on internal mobility. 
Workers only change jobs within a firm if jobs has become vacant, which may 
be originated by a quit. The positive correlation is a second indication that 
internal labour markets are not very prevalent. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the prevalence of internal labor markets by testing 
two obvious predictions from the internal labor market theory. The first 
prediction refers to the importance of career paths within firms. If a job 
opening occurs it is filled on the internal labor market, creating a job opening 
at a lower level, which is filled in the same way until the entry level is 
reached at which external hiring occurs. Therefore, except at the entry level, a 
job opening leads to a vacancy chain, multiple internal moves and at most one 
instance of external hiring. The second prediction refers to the main reason for 
the existence of internal labor markets. Employers try to prevent quits by 
offering good career prospects within the firm, introducing a negative correla-
tion between quits and internal mobility. 
We use data on firms to investigate both predictions. We find that the level 
of internal mobility is rather small compared to the number of newly hired 
workers. This suggests that newly hired workers fill vacancies directly without 
a preceding vacancy chain. Taking account of the panel character of our data 
set, we find a positive correlation between quit and internal mobility rates. 
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This suggests that intemal mobility is not used as an instrument to reduce 
quits. From these results, we conclude that employers do not use intemal 
labor markets as a tooi in the management of the work force. 
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Appendix 1 Definition of Variables 
L "How many workers were employed in your organization in December 1988 
(1990) (no temporary workers). This concerns the number of employees irre-
spective of the number of hours worked". In the 1988 wave the same question is 
asked for the number of workers in December 1986. The numbers of employees 
in December 1987 and December 1989 are constructed by means of the hires (H) 
and the outflow (X) of employees in the next year: L^ = Lt - Ht + Xt. 
H "How many employees entered your organization in 1988 (1990), including 
employees with a probationary period, excluding employees with a temporary 
contract shorter than one year?" 
X "How many employees left your organization in 1988 (1990), excluding 
employees with a temporary contract shorter than one year." X is divided into 
the number of employees who left the organization for the following reasons: 
- pension, early retirement, death; 
- outflow because of disability; 
- firing; 
- quit; 
- end of temporary contract with a duration > one year. 
IM "How many employees changed function and/or changed department within the 
organization?" 
W The weighted average monthiy gross wage in the organization at the time of the 
survey. The employer is asked to distinguish the salary levels of the employees 
in three equal groups. For each group, the maximum wage and the minimum 
wage are registered. The average wage is constructed as 
Ei (Li/L)*(wmini + w ^ / 2 , 
where wmi" and w1™* are the minimum and maximum wage level, respectively. L 
is the number of employees in each group, which is also reported by the 
organization. In the analysis, the wage relatively to the average sectoral wage is 
used, denoted as small w, 
Fraction of employees younger than 30 years 
Fraction of parttime employees in December of each year 
Average fraction of employees absent due to illness. 
Fraction of employees attending internal and/or external course. 
Fraction of employees with a start-up period longer than 300 
days. 
Dummy variable which has a value of 0 in 1988 and a value of 1 in 1990. 
Age 15-29 
Parttime 
Illness 
Course 
Start-up 
D90 
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Appendix 2 Estimates of a structural model of quits and internal mobilitv 
The advantage of a structural model is that a distinction can be made between the 
impact of internal mobility on the workers' quit decision and the impact of quits on 
the internal mobility decision of the employer. The former relationship predicts a 
positive coëfficiënt, but the latter relationship implies a negative coëfficiënt. 
Identifying variables are those which affect either the costs of quits or the costs of 
internal mobility, but not both. It is not easy to come up with identifying variables. 
Therefore, the results in table Al are just a first pass to generate estimates of the 
structural model. 
In order to identify the structural model, we assume that the firm-size has 
no direct impact on the costs of quits, as perceived by the workers. The size of the 
firm is a proxy for the presence of an internal labor market. Obviously, in our case 
the internal mobility equation already performs this role. 
The parameters f of the structural model follow from the reduced form 
parameters rj by imposing restrictions: 
V = Atf) 
A consistent estimate of f can be obtained by the niinimum distance method 
(Chamberlain, 1984) for which 
S = ($ - A(f))'A0) - A(f)) 
must be minimized over £". A is a weighting matrix and rj the reduced form maxi-
mum likelihood estimator of 77. A = vzxirj)'1 gives an efficiënt estimator of f. 
table Al about here 
Table Al presents the estimation results of the structural model. It shows 
that the positive impact of internal mobility on quits is much larger than the negative 
impact of internal mobility on quits. In the quit equation, age and the year dummy 
are significant at the 5% level. In the internal mobility equation, quits, the fraction 
of parttime employees, the fraction of employees on sickness leave, the fraction of 
employees on courses, the size of the firm and the year dummy have a significant 
impact on internal mobility. 
Our estimation results of the structural model are in line with those of the 
reduced form models. Both the negative influence of quits on internal mobility and 
the positive influence of internal mobility on quits are rather weak. 
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Figure 1 Jobs and workers in the firm in periods t and t+1 
t + i 
J t 
•^t+l : Jt _ j D t + l 
. 
1 
J
 f 1 : 
IM2 •*- IM3 « -
IM4 •*-
H l H2 
A • 
Stocks 
J = jobs 
T T 
XI X2 
Flows 
Hl = hires to (newly) created jobs 
H2 = hires to existing jobs 
XI = outflow from existing jobs 
X2 = outflow from destroyed jobs 
IM1 = intemal mobility between existing 
jobs 
IM2 = intemal mobility from existing jobs to 
(newly) created jobs 
IM3 = intemal mobility from destroyed jobs 
to existing jobs 
IM4 = intemal mobility from destroyed jobs 
to (newly) created jobs 
Jc = (newly) created jobs 
JD = destroyed jobs 
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Figure 2 Estimated size of stocks and flows in the Dutch firms: 1990 (%) 
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Table 1 Quits and Internal Mobility, 1988 and 1990. number of firms 
1990 
1988 Q = 0 Q = = 0 Q > 0 Q > 0 Total 
IM = 0 IM > 0 IM = 0 IM>0 
Q=0, IM=0 5 0 2 7 14 
Q=0, IM>0 1 0 7 4 12 
Q>0, IM=0 4 2 30 21 57 
Q>0, IM>0 1 3 26 45 75 
Total 11 5 65 77 . 158 
Table 2 Correlations q and im 
Intermediate Net 
Correlations sample sample 
^nAw 0.372 0.493 
im88,im90 0.193 0.173 
1 8 8 J 1 ^ 8 8 0.163 0.215 
q^inicio 0.123 0.151 
qt>imt 0.135 0.173 
% - qiM,, - im; 0.133 0.069 
Number of firms 444 158 
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Table 3 Means of the variables 
Variable Mean (Standard deviation)a) 
Endoeenous variables 
q 
im 
0.056 (0.05) 
0.032 (0.04) 
change of function 
change of department 
change of function and department 
0.017 (0.03) 
0.006 (0.02) 
0.009 (0.02) 
Personnel characteristics 
Age 15-29 
Parttime 
0.298 (0.17) 
0.167 (0.19) 
Working conditions 
Illness 0.079 (0.04) 
Adiustment costs 
Start-up 
Course 
0.215 (0.41) 
0.242 (0.24) 
Firm characteristics 
1.08 (0.99) 
0.99 (0.15) 
Number of observations 
N*T 316 
a) 5 firms are not included in the net sample because they contain an outlier in one of the variables (1 
outlier for q, 1 for im, 1 for L, 2 for w). In the net sample maximum q and im are 0.30 and 0.22 
respectively. For the intermediate sample, we applied the same selection criterion for the endogenous 
variables (q < 0.35 and im < 0.35), which resulted in an exclusion of 15 firms. 
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Table 4 Estimation results bivariate Tobit regression 
pooled sample random effect 
estimates estimates 
Quit rate 
Age 15-29 0.142 (7.61)** 
Parttime 0.033 (2.09)** 
Illness 0.092 (1.11) 
Start-up -0.001 (0.13) 
Course 0.011 (0.86) 
Lt-i -0.002 (0.69) 
w 0.003 (0.17) 
D90 0.011 (1.83)* 
CONSTANT -0.012 (0.52) 
0\ 0.051, (22.78)** 
Tl 
Internal mobility rate 
Age 15-29 0.071 (2.63)** 0.070 (2.53)** 
Parttime -0.036 (1.51) -0.035 (1.43) 
Illness -0.219 (1.72)* -0.214 (1.65)* 
Start-up -0.003 (0.32) -0.003 (0.31) 
Course 0.067 (3.83)** 0.065 (3.63)** 
L,i 0.016 (3.70)** 0.016 (3.60)** 
w 0.008 (0.27) 0.009 (0.30) 
D90 -0.010 (1.19) -0.009 (1.10) 
CONSTANT -0.028 (0.85) -0.003 (0.88) 
ff2 0.068 (16.87)** 0.065 (13.00)* 
T2 - 0.019 (1.56) 
0.152 (2.07)" 
316 
* Statistically significant from zero at the 10% level. 
** Statistically significant from zero at the 5% level. 
a) absolute t-value in parenthesis, N*T is the number of observations used to estimate and test the 
model; ak, k=l,2, is the Standard error of the regression; Tk, k=l,2, is the Standard error of the 
firm-specific random intercept; pft+E and ps are correlation coefficients in the error structure; X2 is a 
likelihood-ratio test of a change of the parameters, with 20 degrees of freedom. 
0.132 
0.027 
0.113 
0.001 
0.006 
-0.002 
0.001 
0.017 
-0.001 
0.041 
0.029 
(6.61)** 
(1.63) 
(1.32) 
(0.08) 
(0.45) 
(0.61) 
(0.06) 
(3.56)** 
(0.38) 
(16.44)' 
P„+e 0.159 (2.54)' 
P £ 
X (20) 
N*T 
17.9 
316 
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Table Al Estimation results structural modela] 
qt im, 
im -0.131 (0.84) 
q - 0.564 (1.47) 
Age 15-29 0.142 (7.86)** -0.005 (0.08) 
Parttime 0.023 (1.64) -0.050 (2.43)** 
Illness 0.085 (1.28) -0.277 (2.65)** 
Start-up 0.0002 (0.03) -0.004 (0.46) 
Course 0.014 (1.01) 0.062 (4.68)** 
LM 0.017 (4.86)** 
w 0.002 (0.16) 0.008 (0.38) 
D90 0.016 (4.13)** -0.019 (2.14)** 
CONSTANT -0.001 (0.72) -0.002 (1.00) 
N*T 316 316 
CF 0.043 (10.96)** 0.066 (13.96)** 
X 0.031 (6.29)** 0.010 (0.35) 
* Statistically significant from zero at the 10% level. 
** Statistically significant from zero at the 5% level. 
a) absolute t-value in parenthesis, N*T is the number of observations used to estimate the model; a 
is the Standard error of the regression; x is the Standard error of the firm-specific random intercept. 
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